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ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITY AND
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE AT THE
INTERNATIONAL LEVEL:
TRACES OF TENSION AND TRACES OF
SYNERGY
DONALD T. HORNSTEIN*
This Symposium Issue exemplifies the attention increasingly
given to environmental sustainability and environmental justice:  its
value is to focus attention on the relationships between the two.  In
this essay, I make two points about this interrelationship by drawing
on evidence from transnational and international environmental
problems.  First, there may be considerable tension between the sub-
stantive ends toward which each of these concepts points.  For exam-
ple, when sustainability is interpreted as emphasizing notions of sus-
tained yields and carrying capacities, it can lead to results at odds
with the ethical notions of intrinsic value and moral inclusion which
are often described as core notions of environmental justice.
Second, there may be considerable synergy between the two
concepts.  Both concepts emphasize notions of community norms and
participation; this shared emphasis is fertile ground on which to build
policy prescriptions capable of improving such well-known environ-
mental problems such as the tragedy of the commons and monitoring
and enforcement difficulties.  I conclude this essay with only modest
optimism that the concepts of environmental sustainability and envi-
ronmental justice, as important as they are, are sufficiently powerful
to claim true “paradigm” status for the breadth of issues addressed
by environmental law and policy.
* Reef Ivey Research Professor of Law, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
This article may be accessed via the World-Wide Web at <http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/
9DELPFHornstein2>.
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SUSTAINABILITY VERSUS JUSTICE: WATER POLICY AND THE CASE
OF THE NILE RIVER
A common definition of “sustainability” captures the idea of
aligning human consumption with the capacity of ecological systems
to supply, over a long period of time, such natural resources as air,
soil, or water on which production depends.1  In its Declaration of
Principles, the United Nations Conference on Environment and De-
velopment recommends that, “[t]o achieve sustainable development
and a higher quality of life for all people, states should reduce and
eliminate unsustainable patterns of production and consumption . . .
.”2  This notion of sustainability lies at the core of many “commons”
problems, where the central issue is to enable “individuals to sustain
long-term, productive use of natural resource systems.”3
Certainly, few would deny the value of efforts—whether public
or private—that conserve finite resources and prevent unsustainable
resource use.  Such efforts, however, are largely economic in orienta-
tion, based on untested assumptions that the “resources” at issue
should even be “used” in the first place.  Moreover, an unrelenting
focus on the finding and subsequent maximizing of “sustained yield”
more often than not ignores local populations’ claims to “uses” of the
resource that may be at odds with the particular “yield” that is to be
maximized.  To the extent that this occurs, an economic conception
of sustainability is an insufficient theory on which to ground policy-
making.  More to the point, a purely economic notion of sustainabil-
ity may be at odds with ethical notions of moral consideration that
often underlie environmental justice claims.
To illustrate this tension, I offer the case history of current ef-
forts to renegotiate water rights on the Nile River in central and
northern Africa.  Egypt has legal and real-life claims to the lion’s
share of the Nile’s water. Upper riparians, most notably Ethiopia,
1. See, e.g., Paula Abrams, Population Control and Sustainability: It’s the Same Old Song
But With A Different Meaning, 27 ENVTL L. 1111, 1119 & n. 41 (1997) (introducing an analysis
of “sustainability” by referring to rates of natural resource depletion in excess of natural car-
rying capacities); Scott W. Hardt, Federal Land Management in the Twenty-First Century: From
Wise Use to Wise Stewardship, 18 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 345, 396-97 (1994) (referring to
“sustainability” in federal land laws as focusing on “sustaining the yield of renewable re-
sources” rather than on sustaining ecosystems).
2. United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Declaration of Princi-
ples, Principle 8 (1992) (quoted in ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL
REGULATION, LAW, SCIENCE, AND POLICY 1268 (2d ed. 1996)).
3. ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS 1, 1 (1990).
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Sudan, and some of  the “Great Lakes” countries surrounding Lake
Victoria (such as Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Kenya and Tanzania),
historically have used far less of the Nile’s flow, or none at all.
The story of the Nile is interesting, even gripping, in its own
right.  The Nile drains approximately 10 percent of the African conti-
nent.4  It flows through 10 riparian countries that contain some 293
million people who are, on average, among the poorest in the world.5
Any success these riparians have in creating a workable legal regime
governing water allocation would be, by most measures, a major
diplomatic breakthrough.  This might lead to regional improvements
in their standards of living and could, perhaps, even avert war over
dwindling water resources.6
Current efforts to negotiate solutions over the Nile, however, il-
lustrate how gains in optimizing sustainable yield can come at the ex-
pense of losses in non-market values (wildlife and ecosystems).  In
addition, these solutions can drastically affect the ways of life of local
populations (such as the Dinka, Nuer and Shilluk peoples).  Such
losses are hardly unique to the Nile.  Considerable literature has de-
veloped documenting the destruction of ecosystems and displacement
of indigenous peoples worldwide by large-scale water-reclamation
projects.7  Recently, in the American West, policymakers have been
trying to calculate and restore losses inflicted on riparian ecosystems
and communities by our own country’s past efforts to optimize yield
from rivers.8
4. See THE NILE: SHARING A SCARCE RESOURCE 1 (P.P. Howell & J.A. Allan eds.,
1994).
5. See Ashok Swain, Ethiopia, the Sudan and Egypt: the Nile River Dispute, 35 J. MOD.
AFR. STUD. 676, 676 (1997).
6. See Joyce Starr, Special Report: Nations Must Join Together for Water-Conservation
and Sharing Projects to Promote World Peace, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, May 27, 1992, at
12 (reporting that Egyptian President Anwar Sadat’s reaction to Ethiopia’s growing interest in
withdrawing water from the upper Blue Nile basin included the statement, “the only matter
that could take Egypt to war again is water.”).
7. See, e.g., Maria Stavropoulou, The Right Not to Be Displaced, 9 AM. U. J. INT’L L. &
POL’Y 689, 702-05 (1994) (referring to “development-induced” relocation); Zygmund Plater,
Damming the Third World: Multilateral Development Banks, Environmental Diseconomies and
International Reform Pressures on the Lending Process, 17 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y. 121,
127-28 (1988) (discussing the displacement of indigenous peoples by large-scale dam projects).
8. See generally NATURAL RESOURCES LAW CENTER, UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO
SCHOOL OF LAW, RESTORING THE WATERS 4 (1997) (Due to increased priority to ecosystem
values, “[t]he large-scale development of new water supplies through traditional means (dams
and diversions) has virtually ceased . . . [and] [i]n some cases, water that was once diverted has
been put back into the river.”).
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From the current vantage point of Egypt, the Nile’s principal
user, the major problem is too little water.9  This, however, wasn’t al-
ways so.  For over 5,000 years, between 3500 B.C. and the middle of
the nineteenth century (A.D.), Egypt’s principal concern was the sea-
sonality of the Nile flood, which brought both water and nutrient-
laden silt from upstream catchment areas.  When the flood was too
low, cultivated acreage might be halved, causing widespread famine;
when the flood was too high, small-scale riverine irrigation works
were destroyed and fields were swamped, also causing widespread
famine.10  Between 1850 and 1950, engineering advances in dam con-
struction allowed for the first major human-built impoundments on
the Nile.  For example, in 1902 the first dam was completed at As-
wan, in southern Egypt.  The dam allowed for year-round irrigation
in most parts of the Nile valley further north.11  This “low” Aswan
Dam, however, could not protect Egypt from variations in the Nile
flow from year to year.  Upon its independence in 1952, Egypt, under
the leadership of Gamal Abd al-Nasser, chose to expand the dam.
The Aswan dam was converted to a “high” dam capable of im-
pounding and delivering a steady outflow of water, even in years of
the lowest upstream rainfall (which might statistically occur once
every 100 years).12  By 1970, the High Dam at Aswan had been com-
pleted, and Lake Nasser, the world’s third largest human impound-
ment, had been enclosed behind it.13
As Egypt tamed the Nile at Aswan, it largely operated under the
legal assumption that “Egypt is the Nile and the Nile is Egypt.”  The
assumption was correct under the Colonial-era and post-Colonial-era
treaties.  In the Nile Waters Agreement of 1929, the British govern-
ment, on behalf of both Egypt (over which it had effective control)
and Sudan (which the British government administered directly),
provided that Sudan’s water needs would be subordinated to Egypt’s.
Egypt acquired the right to 48 billion cubic meters (“BCM”)  of the
Nile’s flow while Sudan merely acquired the right to 4 BCM (both as
measured at Aswan).14  Even before its independence in 1956, Sudan
was demanding modification of this Agreement, because Egypt’s plan
9. The material that follows is taken largely from Donald T. Hornstein, The Language of
the Nile: Cooperation and Competition in the Use of Watercourses (unpublished manuscript on
file with the Duke Environmental Law & Policy Forum).
10. See GREG SHAPLAND, RIVERS OF DISCORD 60 (1997).
11. See id. at 61.
12. See id. at 63.
13. See DANIEL HILLEL, RIVERS OF EDEN 127 (1994).
14. See JOHN WATERBURY, HYDROPOLITICS OF THE NILE VALLEY 66-67 (1979).
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to build the High Dam at Aswan would create an artificial lake that
would flood parts of Sudanese territory and, more importantly, be-
cause the 1929 Agreement was too restrictive of Sudanese develop-
ment.15  In the post-colonial Agreement for the Full Utilization of the
Nile Waters of 1959, the two independent countries of Egypt and Su-
dan reallocated the Nile.  In this treaty, approximately 14.5 BCM of
previously unallocated water was designated for Sudan and approxi-
mately 7.5 BCM of unallocated water was designated for Egypt.  This
created aggregate treaty rights to Nile water that reflected a total of
55.5 BCM for Egypt and 18.5 BCM for Sudan.16
Although both countries were in a position to appreciate the
colonial hubris under which the Nile had been previously allocated
by the British, neither Egypt nor Sudan recognized the rights of any
of the upstream riparian countries.  In fact, they even agreed to take
a “unified” position should “any question” over the Nile’s allocation
arise “with the governments of any (other) riparian territories . . . .”17
At least as a matter of treaty rights, today Egypt lays claim to most of
the Nile’s flow.
Enter notions of economic “sustainability.”  According to the
conventional wisdom, the problem with the Nile today is one of too
little water—either to accommodate upstream riparians such as
Ethiopia and Uganda that are no longer content to remain outside of
the Nile’s allocation  regime, or  to accommodate Egypt’s demands
for even more water than its current water budget under the 1959
Agreement.18  Furthermore, to meet these human needs, it has been
proposed for over 100 years that the river’s carrying capacity be in-
creased by the construction of a canal in southern Sudan that would
allow the waters of the so-called “White Nile” to bypass the “Sudd,”
one of the largest freshwater marshes in the world, where nearly 60
percent of the White Nile’s water is lost by evaporation and transpi-
15. See Joseph W. Dellapenna, Rivers as Legal Structures: The Examples of the Jordan and
the Nile, 36 NAT. RES. J. 217, 241 (1996).
16. See id.  See also O. Okidi, History of the Nile and Lake Victoria Basins Through Trea-
ties, in THE NILE, SHARING A SCARCE RESOURCE, supra note 4, at 333-34.
17. See Okidi, supra note 16, at 335 (quoting Paragraph (I) of Section V of the 1959
Agreement).
18. See, e.g., JOHN WATERBURY & DALE WHITTINGTON, PLAYING CHICKEN ON THE
NILE? THE IMPLICATIONS OF MICRODAM DEVELOPMENT IN THE ETHIOPIAN HIGHLANDS AND
EGYPT’S NEW VALLEY PROJECT 11 (Oct. 28, 1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the
Duke Environmental Law and Policy Forum) (a reasonable reallocation would give Ethiopia
something on the order of 12 BCM; Egypt, meanwhile, would still need to find water savings of
5-10 BCM just to complete its ambitious reclamation project in southern Egypt, the New Valley
Project).
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ration.19  In the 1959 Nile Waters Agreement, Egypt and Sudan
agreed jointly to finance the construction of such a canal and to share
the “surplus” water thereby created on a 50-50 basis.20  After delays,
caused in part by civil unrest in southern Sudan, excavation of the
“Jonglei Canal,” as the project is known, commenced in 1978.21  In
the early 1980’s, after having partially excavated a canal some 267
kilometers long, the project ended because of renewed fighting be-
tween the government of Sudan and rebel forces led by Dr. John Ga-
rang.22  Although Sudan’s ongoing civil war certainly involves issues
broader than the Jonglei Canal, it bears noting that Dr. Garang re-
ceived a Ph.D. in Agricultural Economics23 for his dissertation,
“Identifying, Selecting, and Implementing Rural Development
Strategies for the Socio-Economic Development in the Jonglei Proj-
ects Area, Southern Region, Sudan.”24
The Jonglei Canal illustrates the tension that can exist between
the concepts of environmental sustainability and environmental jus-
tice.  The Jonglei Canal was neither a casual nor an irrational project
when judged by the logic of maximizing the Nile’s yield.  The Canal
had a reputation of being “the most studied project in the Third
World.”25  It promised to create almost 4 BCM of increased river flow
at Aswan, while simultaneously offering the possibility of irrigating
over 200,000 acres in the vicinity of the canal in southern Sudan.26
Yet these gains were offered without sufficiently considering the
wishes of the Nilotes—Nuer, Dinka, and Shilluk—who live in the sur-
rounding flood area and have a mixed economy of animal husbandry
and crop production.27  Indeed, original proposals for the Canal
would have “threatened substantial areas of toich lands with desicca-
tion” while also draining much of the permanently flooded areas and
adversely affecting “the livelihood for significant numbers of the
swamp’s fishing population.”28  Although a scaled-down plan was
19. See Robert O. Collins, The Jonglei Canal: Illusion or Reality?, 13 WATER INT’L 144,
144 (1988).
20. See id. at 145.
21. See id. at 148.
22. See id. at 153.
23. Dr. Garang received his Ph.D. in 1981 from Iowa State University.
24. See Collins, supra note 19, at 152.
25. See id. at 150.
26. See WATERBURY, supra note 14, at 202.
27. See generally P. Howell & M. Lock, The Control of the Swamps of the Southern Sudan:
Drainage Schemes, Local Effects and Environmental Constraints on Remedial Development in
the Flood Region, in THE NILE, SHARING A SCARCE RESOURCE, supra note 4, at 253.
28. See WATERBURY, supra note 14, at 91-92. “Toich” lands are river-flooded grasslands
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later proposed which would have avoided some of this disruption,29
the local population views decisions concerning the Jonglei Canal as
having been made “apparently without reference to the people
through whose homelands it would pass . . . thus spark[ing] off anxi-
ety and unfavorable reaction among Southern Sudanese sensitive to
the right to manage their own affairs after 17 years of civil war . . . .”30
The interest in self-determination, the environmental justice
concept that local interests in the environment were deserving of
moral respect, was perhaps best highlighted in the early 1980s, when
the scaled-down Jonglei Canal project was rejected by the southern
Sudanese because it did not go far enough.  Where the revised
Jonglei project had projected “development strategies” for the local
population based on “traditional livelihoods,” Dr. John Garang had
been arguing for far more sweeping programs of “drainage and irri-
gation works, mechanized farming, new forms of land tenure, and the
reorganization of the countryside into compact villages.”31  Because
too much of the Sudd’s water would leave the area, “allowing Egypt
and Northern Sudan to benefit from the water saved from the Sudd
was resented in the South.”32
The point to be made transcends the tension between the sus-
tained-yield benefits and the distributive-justice costs of the Jonglei
Canal.  The Tucurui Dam in Brazil eliminated 80% of the settled
villages of the Cuna Indians.  The Narmada Dams Project in India
may displace as many as 1.5 million people. 33  Worldwide, one source
puts the number displaced by development projects between 8 and 15
million.34  But something even more significant than these pockets of
injustice are at stake.  Through economically rational projects such as
the High Dam at Aswan and (should it revive) the Jonglei Canal
Project, the Nile is being changed from a free-flowing river and eco-
                                                                                                                                     
which are an essential seasonal resource for Nilotes during the driest months of the year.  See P.
Howell & M. Lock, supra note 27, at 257.
29. See Collins, supra note 19, at 150 (“The recommendation was to realign the canal east
of the population concentrated in the vicinity of Kongor . . . [and] on September 15, 1979, the
canal was realigned around 100,000 Dinka and some 3000,000 [sic] cattle near Kongor . . . .”).
30. Francis M. Deng, Northern and Southern Sudan: The Nile, in CULTURE AND NE-
GOTIATION, THE RESOLUTION OF WATER DISPUTES 85 (Guy Olivier Faure & Jeffrey Z. Rubin
eds., 1993) (quoting P. HOWELL, M. LOCK & S. COBB, THE JONGLEI CANAL: IMPACT AND
OPPORTUNITY 48 (1988)).
31. See Collins, supra note 19, at 152-153.
32. Deng, supra note 30, at 84 (quoting ABEL ALIER, THE SOUTHERN SUDAN: TOO MANY
AGREEMENTS DISHONORED 203(1990)).
33. See Plater, supra note 7, at 127.
34. See Stavropoulou, supra note 7, at n.67 (citing Michael M. Cernea, Involuntary Reset-
tlement & Development, 25 FIN. & DEV. 44, 332 (1988)).
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system into a regulated irrigation ditch.35  Yet, as historian Donald
Worster observed about the Friant-Kern irrigation canal in Califor-
nia:
And what of the social order, the shape of the western community,
which is reflected in the waters of the ditch . . . .  Exploring the set-
tlements in the vicinity of the Friant-Kern Canal yields at first a
sense of social chaos, of a bewildering disorder of people and their
daily lives, contrasting markedly with the rigid, clean geometry of
the water system . . . .  There is, however, if one looks carefully, a
kind of order underlying this jumbled, discordant West . . . .  It is a
techno-economic order imposed for the purpose of mastering a dif-
ficult environment.  People here have been organized and induced
to run, as the water in the canal does, in a straight line toward
maximum yield, maximum profit . . . .  One might see in that . . . the
qualities of concentrated wealth, technical virtuosity, discipline,
hard work, popular acquiescence . . . but one cannot find in it much
of what Thoreau conceived as freedom.36
The point is not to highlight that sustainability may not always
be consistent with notions of distributive environmental justice, it is
to raise the more disturbing idea that the demands of sustainability
may not even be consistent with underlying notions of freedom.
THE HAPPIER CASE OF SUSTAINABILITY REINFORCING JUSTICE:
PROSPECTS FOR COMMUNITY-BASED ENVIRONMENTAL
MANAGEMENT
The fact that political changes may be required to reorient our
lives to our environment surely should not come as a surprise to a
belief system, such as environmentalism, premised largely on the idea
that everything is connected to everything else.37  Such changes, how-
ever, hardly create an inevitable bleak future of centralized totalitari-
anism.  For years, political scientist Elinor Ostrom has been arguing
that there are other ways than “Leviathan” to solve environmental-
commons problems.38  Most of the alternative approaches revolve
35. See WATERBURY, supra note 14, at 40 (“[T]he essential point is that the new era marks
the total domestication of the Nile, transforming it downstream of the [High Aswan] dam into
nothing more nor less than an enormous irrigation ditch.”).
36. DONALD WORSTER, RIVERS OF EMPIRE 4-7 (1985).
37. See President’s Council on Sustainable Development, Sustainable America: A New
Consensus 9 (1996) (“[T]he essence of sustainable development [is] the recognition that the
pursuit of one set of goals affects others and that we must pursue policies that integrate eco-
nomic, environmental, and social goals.”) (quoted in PERCIVAL, supra note 2, at 67).
38. See, OSTROM, supra note 3, at  8-21 (noting first that some had called only for a
“coercive force,” a Leviathan, to use Hobbes’ term, to solve commons problems before sug-
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around community-oriented structures that monitor and enforce
against antisocial deviations from sustainable resource use (thereby
achieving sustainability), while simultaneously involving local citizens
in both the procedure of decision-making and the substance of sus-
tainability’s joint benefits (thereby achieving justice).  There are, of
course, millions of unanswered questions about how, and even
whether, such a happy concurrence can actually happen in an eco-
nomically complex and interrelated world.  My belief is that such
questions go to one of the most pressing and relevant of social sci-
ence’s  “grand challenges.”  But for present purposes I wish only to
sketch how notions of sustainability and justice can reinforce, rather
than undermine, each other.  The case history I wish to use, like the
case of the Nile, comes from Africa.
In 1995, commentator Andrew Heimert compared two ap-
proaches to conserving the African elephant.39  In what might be de-
scribed as a centralized, rigid command-and-control approach,
Heimert detailed Kenya’s “protection” strategy in which Kenya bans
all hunting and killing of elephants, with an eye to conserving ele-
phants solely for their eco-tourism value.40
In the beginning, Kenya compensated farmers who lost crops to
elephant damage; however, compensation was discontinued in 1989
due to a significant number of fraudulent claims.41  The understand-
able opposition from farmers with legitimate elephant losses was re-
inforced by disclosures that underpaid park rangers were accepting
bribes from elephant poachers and that high-level Kenyan officials
were involved in the corruption.42  The Kenyan approach had abys-
mal results: during the 1980’s, the elephant population in that country
dropped from approximately 65,000 to 19,000.43
In comparison, Zimbabwe has pursued an “active management”
strategy that allows local people to manage wildlife in their area and
to keep some of the profits from their management.  Known as
                                                                                                                                     
gesting that there are alternative solutions).
39. See Andrew J. Heimert, How the Elephant Lost His Tusks, 104 YALE L.J. 1473, 1473
(1995).
40. See id. at 1486 (citing The Wildlife Conservation and Management Prohibition on
Hunting of Game Animals Regulations, 30 KENYA GAZATTE SUPP. (May 20, 1997); The Wild-
life Conservation and Management Revocation of Dealers’ Licenses Act, No. 5 of 1978, 35
KENYA GAZETTE SUPP. (June 23, 1978) at n.123 (noting estimates of $25 million per year from
elephant tourism)).
41. See id. at 1487 (citing RAYMOND BONNER, AT THE HAND OF MAN 214 (1993)).
42. See id. (citing BONNER, supra note 41, at 134).
43. See id. at 1488 (citing Randy Simmons & Urs Kreuter, Save an Elephant - - Buy Ivory,
WASH. POST, Oct.1 1989, at D3).
300 DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM [Vol. 9:289
CAMPFIRE (Communal Areas Management Programme for In-
digenous Resources), this strategy involves compensation for crop
damage as well as community “cash dividends” from the proceeds of
wildlife management.44  In particular, each local council is given a
quota of 1% of the area’s elephants to hunt or cull, an allocation that
is used primarily to sell valuable hunting permits.  The permits can be
sold for between $12,000 and $25,000.  Part of the proceeds are re-
turned to the community, while another part is dedicated to national
wildlife protection.45  To give a sense of scale, one CAMPFIRE dis-
trict’s total foreign aid budget for area-wide nutrition and primary
education programs was only $125,00046—thereby making the dis-
trict’s stake in the health of the local elephant population quite sig-
nificant.  Giving local populations a share of the conservation benefit
has brought ecological, as well as social, benefits: during the 1980’s,
the elephant population in Zimbabwe grew from 30,000 to at least
43,000.47
Allow me to overstate the comparison.  In the command-and-
control system, there was no incentive for the local population to
support ecological goals.  They were not stakeholders (to utilize an
overused phrase) in the commands, and they could only lose from
imposition of the controls.  It is therefore not surprising that the local
population would remain indifferent to evidence that Kenyan park
rangers were profiting from the commons (the elephants) by accept-
ing bribes from poachers.  In Zimbabwe, on the other hand, where
the local population could profit from elephant conservation, the in-
centives were reversed.  According to Heimert, one community “dug
waterholes and provided food to maintain the elephant population
during a drought,”48 and in another community “people abandoned
their homes and created a more centralized settlement to allow more
room for wildlife to flourish.”49
Of course, this overstates the case for community-controlled
commons.  In the case of the CAMPFIRE program,  there have been
44. See id. at 1483-84.
45. See id.  Prior to the imposition of a worldwide ban on the sale of ivory products, Zim-
babwe’s “thriving domestic carving industry” earned $2 million annually from the sale of ivory
gleaned from culls.  Id. at n.81 (citing BONNER, supra note 41, at 107, 265).
46. See id. at 1485 (citing BONNER, supra note 41, at 271).
47. See id. at 1488 (citing Simmons & Kreuter, supra note 43, at D3).
48. Id. at 1488 (citing Brian Child, The Elephant as a Natural Resource, WILDLIFE
CONSERVATION, Mar.-Apr. 1993, at 61).
49. Id. (citing Child, supra note 48, at 61).
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objections to culling on both moral and practical grounds.50  There is
evidence that a worldwide ban on ivory has diminished the profit-
ability of local “rights” to elephants.51  And in the case of the com-
mand-and-control system, the failure of the Kenyan experience may
have as much to do with the overarching non-democratic autocracy
that rules Kenya—and which thereby insulates the corrupt rangers
and their supervisors from oversight by the electorate—rather than
any intrinsic failure in regulatory design.52
More generally, however, the prospect for community-controlled
commons management remains a legitimate, and not simply an over-
stated, possibility.  Elinor Ostrom has documented successful cases of
long-enduring, self-organized, and self-governed common property
resource systems in, among other places,  communally-managed high-
mountain meadows and forests in Switzerland,53 and communally
managed irrigation districts in Spain,54 the Philippines,55 and an in-
shore fishery in Turkey.56  Others have given examples of successful
community forestry in India57 and referred to community-based con-
servation as a mechanism for protecting whole watersheds.58
However, there remains much work to be done.  How, for ex-
ample, is “community”-based conservation to relate to the legitimate
environmental or economic objectives of non-local, overarching insti-
tutions such as state and federal governments?  How is it to relate to
the free-trade objectives of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade?  How is the community to be defined when one leaves the
isolated world of villages and moves into more urban or regional
communities in which overlapping sets of intra-community relation-
ships and an equally vibrant set of relationships with the “outside”
50. See id. at n. 207 (citing Richard E. Leakey, A Perspective From Kenya: Elephants To-
day and Tomorrow, WILDLIFE CONSERVATION, Mar.-Apr. 1993, at 59).
51. See id. at 1484 (“[S]ince the CITES ban on elephant products went into effect, the suc-
cess of the program in Nyaminyami has declined”).
52. See id. at 1499-502.
53. See OSTROM, supra note 3, at 61-65.
54. See id. at 69-82.
55. See id. at 82-88.
56. See id. at 18-21.
57. See Sean T. McAllister, Community-Based Conservation: Restructuring Institutions to
Involve Local Communities in a Meaningful Way, 10 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y, 195,
204-205 (1999).
58. See BOB DOPPELT ET AL., ENTERING THE WATERSHED: A NEW APPROACH TO SAVE
AMERICA’S RIVER ECOSYSTEMS 62-63 (1993), cited in Stephen M. Nicklesburg, Note: Mere
Volunteers? The Promise and Limits of Community-Based Environmental Protection, 84 VA. L.
REV. 1371, 1372 n.3 (1998).
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world are found?  What if the local community excludes certain indi-
viduals or groups of citizens from participation?  What if the local
community finds it more profitable to sell off its resources to the
highest bidder(s) in the international market than to husband re-
sources and share in less-impressive conservation profits?  How
might the creation of community property rights affect the creation
of those more autonomous property rights currently being created
through institutions such as water-marketing institutions or emission-
trading institutions?
I raise these issues not as evidence that community-based con-
servation is impossible beyond the village level.  Indeed, Elinor Os-
trom has documented the success of a common property manage-
ment regime in the very modern setting of southern California
groundwater.59  Rather, I raise these issues to demarcate the chal-
lenges, and some sense of the intellectual excitement, that comes
from the need to reconcile the demands of sustainability, develop-
ment, and justice.
59. See Elinor Ostrom, Community and the Endogenous Solution of Commons Problems, 4
J. THEORETICAL POLITICS 343, 347-350 (1992).
